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Abstract 
Experimental economics uses response times as a tool to evaluate the instinctiveness of choices and 
behaviours. They have been used to define types of subjects, but never to evaluate the stability of such types. 
This paper defines stability of types in terms of the variability exhibited by the choices made by an individual 
in a repeated experiment. The analysis of response times and type stability shows that stability is more 
instinctive than instability, supporting the idea that types exist and that deviations require cognitive effort. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Rubinstein (2007), the interest for response times in 
experimental economics has spread. Nowadays the analysis of response times (RTs henceforth) 
is considered fundamental in experimental economics, and their use in the analysis of 
experimental results is strongly recommended (Clithero, 2018, and Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 
2018). The information provided by RTs concerns instinctiveness of decisions taken during an 
experiment: the faster the decision, the more instinctive it is (Rubinstein, 2016). In other words, 
RTs allow for evaluating how much cognitive effort a decision required to be made. RTs identify 
“the temporal process of integrating choice and response time during […] decision making” (Niu 
et al. 2018, page 45). Of course, RTs are subjective, i.e. they differ across individuals and have 
been found to correlate with some particular behaviours. 
The theoretical literature on game theory very often identifies “player types”, i.e. players 
who share some characteristics that allow clustering these individuals in a so-called type (see 
for example Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Rubinstein (2016) empirically identifies some of 
these types using a set of experiments in economics; other types (co-operators, free-riders, 
reciprocators, etc.) have been identified by the extant experimental literature in several 
different articles, books and experiments. Nevertheless, there might be some variability also 
within types: i.e. a player who on average sticks to some well-identifiable strategy may deviate 
from it when the game presents several rounds (repetitions). In other words, a type’s strategy 
may not be stable over time, and different players may exhibit different degrees of such a 
strategic stability. This paper takes the average behaviour of a person as the representation of 
her “type”; in other words, the type is assumed to coincide with the average behaviour revealed 
by the individual1.  
The extant literature uses the concept of behavioural stability, with particular reference 
to the field of evolutionary game theory, where stability refers to the probability of type 
mutations. Often mutation derives from the encounter between individuals of different types, 
who contaminate each other. In the present paper, a different concept of stability is used. On 
the one hand, mutations in different ways may occur to the same individual over time. For 
                                                            
1 Despite the emphasis placed on types, this paper does not aim at providing any taxonomy of types. Rather, these last 
are simply assumed to exist, and their number is assumed undefined. For the purpose of this paper, these assumptions 
are enough.  
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example one may be a reciprocator at time t, a free-rider at time t+1 and reciprocator again at 
time t+2. On the other hand, in addition to these extreme mutations, the extent to which a 
subject is a reciprocator may vary over time, without generating a full mutation (i.e. without 
transforming an individual of a certain type in an individual of another type). In other words, 
types may allow some degrees of variability, without changing the type.  
The degree of cooperation is an example of a strategy, which may vary during an 
experiment: repeated PGGs clearly show that players’ contributions decline over time, i.e. 
degree of cooperativeness of the subjects involved in the game evolves over the rounds. It may 
be the case, however, that – given the others’ strategies – some individuals stick more to a given 
(preferred) degree of cooperativeness than others. The analysis of subjects’ contributions in a 
repeated PGG and of their RTs may shed some light on how instinctive (or thoughtful) sticking 
to some strategy (partially ignoring the external environment) is. In other words, RTs may help 
to understand whether people whose contributions do not change much over rounds exhibit 
such a constant behaviour cognitively or instinctively. Knowing this may help to understand 
whether stable strategies are the result of a thought or of an instinctive behaviour, and, more 
in general, if “types” are instinctive or not. 
The empirical results presented in this paper are based on a traditional PGG played for 
five rounds. The focus is on the link between RTs and consistency of individual contributions 
across rounds, measured as the coefficient of variation of the contributions over the five rounds 
of the game. Indeed, small variability of contributions between rounds may suggest that the 
individual follows a precise strategy and is less sensitive to the others’ behaviour than a person 
whose contributions vary much across rounds. Large variability is likely a symptom of context 
dependency, while the opposite seems to be true in case of small variability of contributions. 
The results of the paper show a positive link between the two variables, suggesting that people 
who think more about how much to contribute respond to the context more than people who 
think less. Such a result is consistent with the extant literature, which shows that decisions 
involving more thinking are also slower than the more instinctive. It is noteworthy that the 
context to which players respond may be represented by the rules of the game, by the others’ 
behaviour observed in the previous rounds or by both. 
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2. Related literature and hypotheses 
The economics literature has already exploited the concept of stability; in particular, in 
evolutionary game theory, where the behaviour of the experimental subjects has been studied 
dynamically in repeated games. Güth and Nitzan (1997) proposed two theoretical models of 
preference stability in the PGG setting. The models proposed consider a population composed 
of two different types and its evolution over time; the possibility of mutations of one type into 
the other characterises the definition of stability, and the probability of mutation at time t is 
endogenously determined by the resources earned by the individual in the rounds of the game 
preceding time t. The authors conclude that, with finite numbers of individuals, the population 
evolves to a monomorphic one entirely composed of free-riders. 
Guttman (2000) shows that, under some circumstances, preferences for reciprocity are 
stable in a sub-sample of the population. Kurzban and Houser (2005) consider the stability of 
contributions in a PGG, and identify three types of players: reciprocators, co-operators and free-
riders, concluding that “our human subject population is in a stable, polymorphic equilibrium of 
types” (page 1803). However, the analysis of the two authors grounds on the time series profiles 
of subjects’ contributions, without taking into account any specific measure of variability. 
The existing theoretical models consider stability as a characteristic of a type and analyse 
its survival and evolution within a population. In addition, evolutionary game theory takes 
stability as a fixed condition, to which it opposes mutation. In other words, mutation is what 
hinders stability of types: the definition is thus discrete and dichotomous in the sense that only 
mutants and non-mutants are allowed. Instead, this paper defines types as “average 
behaviours” and their instability as variability around this average behaviour to account for the 
possibility that the main characteristics of a type may appear neater in an individual than in 
another, while both belong to the same type. As blue eyes of different persons present different 
nuances, so characteristics such as reciprocity and trustworthiness may have different 
gradations, without losing their intrinsic property of reciprocity and trustworthiness. 
Nowadays, one of the main uses of RTs in analysing individual choices relates to 
selfishness. A number of studies (for a review see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2018) have found 
that faster decisions mirror self-interested decisions. Piovesan and Wengström (2009) analyse a 
dictator game and find that egoistic choices are faster than generous offers. Always using a 
dictator game, Cappelletti et al. (2011) find that strategic thinking requires longer RTs and 
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correlates with higher offers. In a different setting, Rubinstein (2013) shows that the subjects 
who decide faster are more likely to take mistaken decisions, although such short RTs are 
uncorrelated with behaviours that conflict with standard theories. In a pure distribution game 
Ubeda (2014) observes that faster decisions are also more selfish, in the sense that slow deciders 
are more likely to consider moral trade-offs when choosing how to split the cake. Similar 
conclusions are reached in an experiment based on value orientation: the decisions of the more 
individualistic subjects are faster than those of the prosocial participants (Chen and Fischbacher, 
2016). Brañas-Garza et al. (2017) in a “Yes-or-No” game show that decisions involving strategic 
risks require longer RTs, as risk-aversion generally induces people to take less instinctive 
decisions. Finally, Evans and Rand (2019) find that strategic cooperation requires more time to 
take a decision in payoff-maximising games.  
A possible interpretation of RTs is in the light of the dual thinking process (Kahneman, 
2011): fast responses are provided only by system 1; when, instead, also system 2 is activated, 
RTs are longer. Scholars have developed some literature on this approach. Alós-Ferrer and Strack 
(2014) provide a survey of dual processes in economics, and, in particular, highlight that duality 
does not mean mutual exclusivity between two processes; rather it implies continuity between 
automatic and controlled responses (see also Kruglanski et al., 2006). Nevertheless, Brocas and 
Carrillo (2014) highlight that the existence of different processes of decision making in the 
human brain and the interaction between them generates “different selves”, i.e. different types, 
to adopt game theoretical lexicon.  
Some articles focus on how RTs and contributions to the provision of a public good 
correlate; these experiments generally use a standard public goods game (PGG). The first study 
to related RTs and PGG is Lotito et al. (2013), who find that faster decisions about how much to 
contribute to a public good are associated with lower contributions than slower decisions. Lohse 
et al. (2017) obtain the same result in an experiment on the provision of environmental public 
goods. Recalde et al. (2018) show two interesting results: on the one hand, individuals who are 
insensitive to monetary incentives decide faster. On the other hand, when the equilibrium of 
the PGG is below the mid-point of the available decision set, faster deciders give less than the 
slow, but the result is reversed when the equilibrium point is above the mid-point of the 
available decision set. This result is interesting, as it highlights that the correlation between RTs 
and individual behaviour may depend on the context and on the rules of the game. Similarly, 
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Hallsson et al. (2018) show that self-interested behaviours are not always intuitive; in settings 
where fairness considerations are also involved, there are cases in which selfish decisions are 
taken more slowly than pro-social choices2. Moreover, in repeated games, such as the PGG, RTs 
may also decrease because of Bayesian updating. Players may indeed update their believes 
according to what happened in the past rounds, thus reinforcing their heuristics, although such 
a possibility is mediated by the magnitude of the incentives provided to the players (Alós-Ferrer 
and Hügelschäfer, 2012). 
The most relevant study for the analysis proposed here is Börger (2016). The author uses 
an online choice survey on the installation of an offshore windfarm in the Irish Sea (in the UK 
territorial waters). The survey was on the design of an already approved windfarm; indeed, 
different designs were associated with different environmental impacts. In particular, the shape 
of the windfarm was deemed to affect the degree of biodiversity in the sea neighbouring the 
farm itself. People were therefore invited to choose between different possible characteristics 
of the future windfarm, for which the potential impacts on biodiversity were disclosed. The data 
were then analysed to understand whether the participants expressed consistent choices over 
the different characteristics of the future windfarm and the RTs were used as one of the control 
variables. The results show that longer RTs were associated to less randomness in responding 
the survey. In other words, people with longer RTs were more consistent in expressing their 
preferences; from a statistical point of view, this suggests lower variance in their decisions than 
in those of faster deciders. Another article, whose results are very relevant for the present paper 
is Campbell et al. (2018): Here the authors show that, when measuring preferences for honey 
characteristics in a sample of Danish consumers through an online survey, the measurement 
error decreases with RTs; i.e. the longer the RT, the larger the measurement error. However, 
both works are based on online surveys, i.e. they are not real experiments strictly speaking. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Defining stability 
As mentioned before, the literature defines behavioural stability in terms of absence of 
type mutation. Instead, this paper allows for some variability within each type of the traits that 
                                                            
2 On the interpretation of RT as pure measure of instinctiveness, see also Migheli (2017). 
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define it; thus the paper assumes that each type is characterised by a continuous distribution 
of its distinctive characteristic and that the distribution of types may be continuous, i.e. types 
may be contiguous (Friedman and Sing, 2009; Cardaliaguet and Rainer, 2012 and Rabanal, 
2017). For the purposes of this paper and without loss of generality, types define also the 
behaviours of the subjects, i.e. their acting according to the categories of behavioural 
economics (see Camerer, 2003 and Dhami, 2017). According to this definition, each type of 
player may be defined in function of some trait 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 so that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝(𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖), where 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 is a type-specific 
trait (or behaviour, in the case of behavioural analysis), which defines type 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 and determines 
the continuity of the type both between and within individuals. More in general, we may 
assume that set 𝑃𝑃 contains all the population, and that this set is partitioned in types 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 =1, … ,𝑛𝑛 with 𝑛𝑛 finite, for each of which there exists a trait 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖, which defines it. These traits may 
be treated as random variables, so that each of them follows some random distribution, with 
mean 𝜇𝜇𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖  (which may be defined as the “central trait” of the type), and finite and bounded 
variance 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖) = 𝑘𝑘, 𝑘𝑘 ∈ Ξ = �𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 , 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖�, where 𝜉𝜉, and 𝜉𝜉 are two finite real numbers such that 
𝜉𝜉 >  𝜉𝜉, which define the range of variation of each type 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖. Such formulation refers to what we 
may call “social types”, i.e. type 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 characterises a group of individuals who are drawn from the 
same type. In other words, individuals, who show trait 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 belong to type 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖. So, for example, 
generous people are all drawn from the generous type. The variability depends on the fact that 
different individuals may show different degrees of generosity: charity donations may be 
assumed as proxies of generosity; yet, while some persons donate large amounts (and shares) 
of their income, others donate less (both in absolute and relative terms). This between-type 
variability motivates 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖) in the previous formulation. The size of 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖) provides a 
measure for the stability of social type 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖. It is noteworthy that stability here is taken as a 
synonymous of variability within the type, rather than as a term indicating the (un)likelihood of 
mutating. In this sense, stability here recalls the idea of business cycle around the trend: the 
less the cycle oscillates around the trend, the more stable the economic growth is. 
A similar concept of stability applies here also to individuals: while they may continue 
belonging to the same type, their behaviour may vary within this type. Indeed, “the human 
individual is also subject to continuous transformation” and “[h]uman beings, like social 
systems, are organisations in process” (Lawson 2015, page 42). We may refer to this variability 
as “within-type” variability. Continuing the example of the generous person, she may become 
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more or less generous than she was in the past, without losing her characteristic of generosity. 
In other words, also each individual, characterised by a type, will exhibit a given behaviour with 
some variability. Mutations are not excluded by the formulation presented: when the individual 
variance of 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 exceeds its upper bound, the individual transitions from a type to another. In this 
sense, types are fixed (i.e. the population is portioned in sets with immutable characteristics), 
while their magnitude (i.e. the number of people belonging to some type) are not. This 
definition allows, for example, some types to be empty sets, when nobody belongs to them, 
without the type losing its characteristics. 
The definition of within-type stability depends on the magnitude of the variance of the 
individual trait within each type. This variance, although bounded for the type, may differ 
between individuals. The smaller the variance at subject level, the more stable the type is for 
the subject. Formally: taken two individuals 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑘𝑘 belonging to the same type 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 such that 
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗� > 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘� and both variances are within Ξ, the behaviour of the latter individual is 
more stable than that of the former within type 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖. In a similar vein, the type of a person is more 
or less stable over time according to how much the variance of her choices varies over time: 
stability increases when 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖) decreases and vice versa. 
3.2. Experimental methodology 
The data of this study come from a traditional PGG repeated for five rounds with 
anonymous random re-matching after each round (Andreoni, 1988 and Botelho et al. 2009). 160 
subjects participated in the experiment, divided in eight sessions with 20 players each. The 
subjects were all undergraduate students recruited through advertising; they enrolled on 
voluntary basis, and played five rounds of a standard PGG in lab. Each participant received an 
endowment of 60 experimental monetary units (EMUs), at the beginning of each round and was 
asked how many of these EMUs – between 0 and 60 – she was willing to contribute to a common 
fund. The EMUs accumulated during the rounds were not usable in the next. She was also 
informed that she was part of a group of four people, all sitting in the same room at the same 
time, and that these other three people were asked to make the same choice at the same time 
as she. The subjects also knew that experimenters would then have doubled the sum of the 
contributions to the fund and the total divided equally between the four members of the group, 
independently of the individual contributions. The participants also knew that the game would 
have been repeated five times and at each time, they would have been matched with three 
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other people they never met in the previous or in the following rounds. This procedure together 
with the dimension of the lab (20 PCs) constrained the round to a maximum number of five. 
The random re-matching procedure allows minimising the interdependence of 
observations. Indeed, if the subject plays always with the same three people, the probability 
that the choice of the other members of the group affects her choice would be very high. 
Although the subjects might be influenced by what happened in the previous rounds, i.e. what 
the others did in the previous round(s) may affect one’s choices, random re-matching dilutes 
this effect, rendering it less important. At the end of the game all the players were paid the total 
amount accumulated during the five rounds. 
 
3.3 Empirical methodology 
The aim of this paper is to capture the relationship – if any – between RTs and the level 
of type stability of the individuals. In the context of experimental economics, such a stability is 
evaluated with respect to the behaviours exhibited by the experimental subjects. To this end, in 
the framework of a PGG, we construct a set of variables that may capture the variability of the 
choices of each subject during the experiment. The extant literature led to the choice of the 
game used in the inquiry; indeed, PGGs typically involve a number of rounds, where the game 
repeats identically, the evolution of the subjects’ behaviour over time is well known, the 
protocol is consolidated and easy to understand for the participants, and the interpretation of 
the results is simple. 
To the aforementioned goal, the coefficient of variation (CV) of the contribution over the 
five rounds is calculated at individual level. With respect to the standard deviation (SD), the CV 
has the advantage of expressing the variability in relative more than in absolute terms. This 
property allows for comparing variability, while controlling for differences in average 
contributions across subjects and has already been applied to study the results of a PGG (Page 
et al., 2005). The rationale behind this measure is to account for the decreasing utility of money, 
so that an increase in the contribution of one EMU is worth more when, for instance, the average 
contribution is 10 EMUs than when it is 55 EMUs. This measure of variability, however, does not 
allow exploiting the panel dimension of the data, as it produces one observation per subject. 
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The panel dimension is exploitable using different measures of variability. In particular, 
three measures are the bases of the empirical analysis presented in the next section; the first is 
simply the absolute value of difference of the contribution at each round with respect to the 
mean individual contribution. Formally: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 −  15 ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡5𝑡𝑡=1 �, where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the 
contribution of subject i at time t. The resulting variable is a sort of “decomposition of the CV” 
in its each-round components; however, it allows for more in-depth looking at the relationship 
between RT and difference of a contribution from the mean. Indeed, while the CV is a synthetic 
measure, this decomposition allows for exploiting the panel dimension and therefore for 1) 
controlling for individual fixed effects and 2) maximising the quantity of information (i.e. 
variance) used in the regressions.  
Finally, the absolute difference between 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is also computed and regressed 
against RTs to understand whether larger deviations from the previous choice require more 
decision time. Positive and negative deviations are then analysed separately with the aim of 
inquiring whether positive and negative deviations from the previous contribution engender 
differences also in the times needed to take the decision. Indeed, choosing to be less 
cooperative may be different from choosing to be more cooperative in terms of instinctiveness. 
This measure is less representative of the subject’s type stability than the other two – at least 
when the definition of stability given in section 3.1 holds; nevertheless, it serves as robustness 
check and for exploring a side of stability not directly addressed by the theoretical framework 
presented in the previous sections. 
The aforementioned variables will constitute the dependent variables in the analysis. 
Indeed, if we accept that RTs measure instinctiveness, logically in the neural process the 
instinctive response precedes the choice or is – at least – contemporaneous to it. In other words, 
if the RTs are expression of the cognitive process, and the last step of it is the choice, then it is 
advisable to use RTs as regressors and the variability as dependent variable, even when claims 
of causality are not raised. 
Data are analysed mainly by the means of regression techniques. In particular, when the 
dependent variable is the CV, multilevel regressions with random effect at individual level are 
estimated. Standard errors clustered at session level account for possible session fixed effects 
that may affect the outcomes of the experiment; this strategy contributes to control for the 
noise induced by interdependence of observations, producing results that are as clean as 
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possible. When differences between contributions constitute the dependent variable, the 
analysis relies on panel regressions with standard errors clustered at session level for the same 
reason as above. For the sake of robustness, the analysis also presents estimates from panel 
multilevel models with random effects calculated at different levels, which include random 
intercepts at individual level and session level. Some specifications will present estimates 
obtained with random intercepts at session level and random slopes at individual level. They are 
another possible way to account for heterogeneity between subjects and allow testing the 
robustness of the results obtained using other econometric strategies. 
Usual controls are part of the regressions. In particular, gender, a trend variable (for 
panel estimations), lagged values of the common fund, average contributions of the other 
members of the group in the previous round all constitute control variables used in the analyses. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis, whose results are 
shown and discussed in the next section. The table is divided in two panels: the upper one 
reports the descriptive statistics for the collapsed dataset at individual level; the lower one 
shows the same statistics for the full panel data (i.e. not collapsed at individual level). The figures 
in the table show that there is quite a large variability of both RT and CV. The sample is almost 
balanced in gender terms, although there is some prevalence of males; the negative mean of 
the difference between one’s contribution in round t and that in round t-1 is due to the usual 
decrease of cooperation over rounds (see Figure 2). 
 
4. Results 
Figure 1 presents the cumulative density functions (CDFs) of the coefficients of variations 
for two groups of subjects, identified according to their average RTs being above or equal to or 
below the average RT of the sample. The figure clearly shows that the CDF of the subjects whose 
RT is above the mean stochastically dominates the CDF of the other group. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff test (p-value < 0.001) confirms that the two distributions are statistically different from 
each other. This graphical representation of the data suggests that the faster the choice about 
the contribution, the less the latter varies over the rounds of the game. In other words, 
instinctiveness is associated with less variability in the contributions: this result may suggest that 
players whose choices are less sensitive to the others’ are faster deciders. However, more in-
12 
 
depth analyses are needed to understand better the relationship between RTs and contribution 
variability. 
The following tables present estimates obtained using different specifications. The 
response times enter all of them either in absolute or in logarithmic terms; this difference serves 
as a robustness check for how the response times are measured. In particular, the logarithmic 
specification allows for weighing more time differences when decision time is short than when 
it is long; in other words, a difference of one second when decision time is short weighs more 
than the same difference when decision time is long. Gender (a dummy taking value 1 if the 
subject is male, 0 otherwise) is also included: experimental research in economics provides 
indeed abundant evidence on the existence of gender differences in experimental settings. A 
synthetic measure of the behaviour of the other members of the groups in which subjects played 
appears in the regressions, to capture the effect of the others’ decisions. Eventually some 
specifications include also the occurrence of full cooperation (i.e. contributing the entire 
endowment in a round) or free riding (i.e. contributing 0 in a round) choices. Panel analyses 
include punctual choices, i.e. whether in a round the subject fully cooperated or free rode; non-
panel analyses include the share of times (over the five rounds) the subject chose one of these 
two extreme behaviours.  
The first part of the econometric analysis follows directly the graphical evidence just 
discussed: the CV of each subject over the five rounds of the game is regressed against average 
RT and other controls. Table 2 reports the results of different specifications of the regression 
run using multilevel models with random intercepts at session level and random slopes at 
individual level, and standard errors clustered at session level. The figures show that, as the RTs 
increase, so does the CV. The effect is small, as an extra second taken for deciding reflects in an 
increase in the CV by something less than 0.005, i.e. an increase of 3.6%3 in RT is associated with 
an increase of 0.9% 4 in CV, suggesting that CV is not much elastic with respect to RT. The 
coefficient of RT is stable and robust to different specifications. The inclusion of the share of 
times the individual chose to contribute 0 or the whole endowment does not change the 
magnitude and the statistical significance of the RT coefficient much, but shows that free riding 
is a less stable behaviour than full cooperation. This result is consistent with the evidence 
                                                            
3 Calculated on the mean value.  
4 Calculated on the mean value.  
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provided by the literature showing that cooperation is less instinctive than free riding, and 
appears to be a conscious and thoughtful strategy. The variability of the others’ contributions 
experienced by the subject seems to have no effect on the variability of the contributions of the 
subject herself. 
The likelihood-ratio tests show that estimates from multilevel regressions are preferable 
to linear estimates only for the first two specifications. Indeed, the logarithms of the standard 
deviations of the random intercepts are negative and statistically highly significant, suggesting 
that there is a small variability both at individual and session levels. This indication from the 
estimates also suggests that environmental factors and individual fixed effects have little 
influence on CVs once RTs are controlled for, suggesting that choice variability is hardly context 
dependent and that RTs well represent the individual unobservables that are related to the 
(in)stability of contributions. Indeed, individual fixed effects regressions confirm this evidence: 
the addition of individual fixed effects renders the coefficient of RTs statistically non-significant, 
indicating that RTs capture the individual characteristics, which render the observed behaviours 
more or less stable. 
Table 3 presents regressions on the same specifications of the same model as Table 2 
with random intercepts at both individual and session levels, with random coefficients for the 
variable of interest at individual levels. In this case, thus, the analysis assumes that individuals 
do not to respond differently to different sessions, but that their individual fixed effects are 
unrelated to session characteristics. The results are qualitatively identical to those presented in 
Table 2; also quantitatively, the changes are marginal. The logarithms of the standard deviations 
of the individual intercepts show some small variability between individuals, confirming the 
partial conclusions derived from the previous table. 
The next tables present empirical results that exploit the full panel dimension of the data. 
In particular, Table 4 shows panel multilevel models with random intercepts at both subject and 
session levels, where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable. Again, the RTs display positive and 
statistically significant coefficients (apart from specification 2), which suggest that the longer the 
subject thought about how much to contribute, the more the contribution differed from the 
subject’s mean. Such a result is in line with what has already been shown in Tables 2 and 3. The 
random parameters show that, while there is no variability between sessions, there is some 
variability between subjects within each session; indeed, the log-likelihood ratio tests suggest 
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that multilevel analysis should be preferred to linear regressions. Evidence stands out about the 
lack of statistical significance of the coefficient of being full co-operator. Such a result indicates 
that co-operators’ contributions do not diverge much from the means, differently from what 
happens with the free riders’, consistent with what has already been observed. Free riding 
presents a positive and statistically significant coefficient; this piece of evidence suggests that 
the subjects who try this strategy exhibit larger variability in their choices than full co-operators. 
Perhaps this indicates that co-operators are less sensitive to the environment than free riders5. 
Table 5 presents figures estimated through the same specifications as those in Table 4, but the 
fact that random intercepts are both at session level and individual level, and random slopes at 
this last level are allowed with respect to the variable capturing RTs. Qualitatively the results do 
not change, although some control variables (in particular that capturing the cooperative 
behaviour) gain statistical significance.  
Tables 6 and 7 present the outcomes of regressions where the absolute change between 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 is the dependent variable. The estimation strategy is the same as above: panel 
multilevel models nested either at session and individual level or at session and individual level 
with random coefficients at individual level for the RT variable. The tables report estimates, 
taking the natural logarithm, of |𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 −  𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1| as dependent variable. In fact, the use of the natural 
value of the difference provides results that are not statistically significant. However, the use of 
the logarithmic transformation  leads to results that are both statistically significant and in line 
with the previous evidence. This result suggests that the link between RTs and 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(∆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) is not 
linear but exponential; in other words, as the RT increases, so does ∆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 with increasing absolute 
speed, as there is a positive association between the individual RT and the difference between 
two contributions in two immediately subsequent rounds. The variability at the level of sessions 
and individuals is very small, and in some cases so close to zero to be statistically non-different 
from this value. This piece of information suggests that there are few individual characteristics 
non-included in the regression, which influence the observed results.  
Splitting the sample between contributions higher than and lower than the mean does 
not provide any interesting result. Indeed, the coefficients of RTs are statistically significant and 
of equal magnitude in both cases, indicating that what matters is not the direction of the 
deviation of contribution in a round with respect to the individual mean, but only the magnitude 
                                                            
5 However further research is needed to shed more light on this point. 
15 
 
of such a difference. In other words, what requires more time for deciding is the magnitude, but 
not the direction of the deviation from the mean. This result may suggest that small differences 
from the average may more likely be random (or, at least, less thoughtful) than large differences 
are. In addition, the statistical significance of the coefficient of RTs is not stable across different 
specifications, and the loss of significance is larger when the difference between 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 is 
negative. This last result suggests that choosing to deviate positively from the previous choice 
requires more time than the opposite choice, in line with the evidence observed about free-
riding (which results to be more instinctive than cooperation).  
It is noteworthy that – for the sake of robustness – tobit and panel tobit estimates were 
also computed for the specifications presented in this section and analysed through multilevel 
regressions. The results are not qualitatively different from those presented here. The tobit 
strategy was chosen following Moffatt (2016): the contributions to the public fund are 
constrained between 0 and 60 EMUs by the experimenters. Consequently, there cannot be any 
variation outside the range [-60, 60], and the CVs are constrained in [0, 45]; such constraints 
may engender masses of probability on the two extremes, what may require tobit estimation. 
However, the masses on density on the extremes are not big enough to render tobit estimates 
much different from multilevel estimates, on which, as a consequence, this paper relies. 
5. Conclusions 
Starting from the consolidated interpretation of RTs in experiment as a measure of 
instinctiveness in decision-making, this paper has presented evidence in favour of longer RTs to 
be linked to higher variability in the contributions in a PGG game. While several articles on the 
link between RTs and the outcomes of different experiments in economics exist, RTs had never 
been used in relationship with the variability of decisions in repeated games. Here, the 
assumption is that subjects who follow a given strategy belong to a given “type” in the sense of 
theoretical game theory. The aim of the empirical analysis was to understand if the stability of 
these types is the result of instinctive or thoughtful responses to the environment in an 
experimental framework. The results of the paper suggest that types are instinctive, as the 
magnitude of the contribution variability in a PGG is positively associated with RTs: to deviate 
from own instinctive strategy requires cognitive efforts, which translate in observable RTs. Of 
course, such evidence does not mean that instinctive subjects are irrational, or that strategies 
are necessarily not well pondered. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence offered in this paper 
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suggests that the degree of perseverance in playing a strategy in a PGG does not necessarily 
respond to the others’ contributions made in the previous round (indeed, all the variables 
included in the regressions that try to capture such an effect present coefficients that are not 
statistically significant)6. In other words, the magnitude of the deviation from the average 
individual behaviour does not seem to depend on the absolute behaviour of the other players 
in the past. 
The results of the paper show that type (behavioural) stability is more instinctive than 
instability and therefore suggests that types generate spontaneous behaviours, while deviations 
from the central trait of the type requires cognitive effort. Moreover, in accordance with the 
dual-process theory, the paper shows also that deviations from the own type and from previous 
decisions are likely to require the activation of system 2. In other words, types suggest 
immediate response, which environmental factors may require to modify. When such changes 
are big, RTs are long, as the first require a cognitive effort that activates system 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 Ancillary panel regressions of RTs in round t on the contributions of the other members of the group in the past rounds 
never provide statistically significant evidence of the existence of such a link. Although there is evidence that the higher 
the average contribution of the other members of the group at time t-1, the higher the contribution of the subject in 
round t, this evidence does not automatically imply that a link between one’s contribution variability and the level of 
the others’ contributions exists. Indeed, the empirical results of the paper do not provide any support for such a link. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel A: data collapsed at individual level
Coefficient of variation of contributions 0.579 0.528 0 2.236
Response time (seconds) 27.722 20.441 3.4 116.4
Average individual contribution 32.939 17.484 0 60
CV of the contributions  other members of the group 0.573 0.191 0 2.137
Mean value of the fund 135.26 36.377 55.6 355.2
Males (as percentage of the sample) 57.50
Free riders (as percentage of the sample) 16.75
Full cooperators (as percentage of the sample) 30.87
Number of observations: 160
Panel B: full panel dataset
Difference of individual's contribution from her mean 0 15.947 -48 48
Difference of individual's contribution from the group's mean -1.168 27.171 -60 60
Difference of individual contribution from her median 2.939 23.331 -30 30
Number of observations: 800
Note: the values of the dummy variables do not change from one sample definition to the other, by construction. 
Difference of individual's contribution from her contribution in 
the previous round
-2.880 22.335 -60 60
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Table 2. Variability of contributions and response times
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Response time 0.00485 0.00485 0.00346
(0.00196)** (0.00191)** (0.00125)***
Logarithm of response time 0.113
(0.0420)***
Male 0.114 0.118 0.0377 0.0411
(0.0489)** (0.0432)*** (0.0481) (0.0501)
(0.360)
Free rider 1.880 1.887
(0.105)*** (0.114)***
Full cooperator -0.270 -0.253
(0.0473)*** (0.0477)***
Constant 0.377 0.422 0.314 0.0530
(0.0834)*** (0.182)** (0.0630)*** (0.139)
Log of the s.d. of random slope (by subject) -7.124 -7.057 -27.39 -25.65
(1.373)*** (1.186)*** (71.75) (107.7)
Log of the s.d. of intercepts (by session) -2.266 -2.221 -2.858 -2.954
(0.530)*** (0.506)*** (0.443)*** (0.489)***
Log of the variance of the residuals -0.705 -0.707 -1.287 -1.290
(0.0859)*** (0.0881)*** (0.126)*** (0.125)***
Wald chi-squared 7.70 14.34 1,141.81 1,075.14
Log-pseudolikelihhod -111.73 -111.66 -22.49 -21.69
LR test chi-squared 3.53 3.53 1.60 1.16
Number of observations 160 160 160 160
Notes
Dependent variable: coefficient of variation of contributions over the five rounds. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Mixed effects model estimates; random intercepts at session level, random slopes at individual level.
The RTs are in seconds. Free rider and Full cooperator record the share of rounds in which the individual chose to
contribute zero EMUs (free rider) or the entire endowment (full cooperator). 
Coefficient of variation of the contributions of the 
other memebrs of the group
-0.0977
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Table 3. Variability of contributions and response times
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Response time 0.00611 0.00617 0.00506
(0.00245)** (0.00244)** (0.00160)***
Logarithm of response time 0.112
(0.0390)***
Male 0.114 0.120 0.0271 0.0308
(0.0562)** (0.0528)** (0.0485) (0.0490)
(0.336)
Free rider 1.980 1.994
(0.115)*** (0.123)***
Full cooperator -0.254 -0.248
(0.0495)*** (0.0515)***
Constant 0.345 0.418 0.263 0.0450
(0.0937)*** (0.190)** (0.0606)*** (0.127)
Log of the s.d. of random intercepts (by session) -2.070 -1.981 -3.385 -3.581
(0.397)*** (0.404)*** (0.634)*** (0.822)***
Log of the s.d. of random intercepts (by subject) -0.811 -0.879 -1.848 -1.785
(0.152)*** (0.166)*** (0.176)*** (0.180)***
Log of the s.d. of random slopes of RTs (by subject) -5.314 -5.259 -5.052 -5.064
(0.612)*** (0.608)*** (0.206)*** (0.235)***
Log of the s.d. of the residuals -2.024 -1.640 -2.423 -2.615
(0.160)*** (0.165)*** (0.184)*** (0.180)***
Wald chi-squared 6.66 14.66 1,834.81 1,947.16
Log-pseudolikelihhod -110.88 -110.66 -9.48 -9.41
LR test chi-squared 5.24 5.53 27.62 25.72
Number of observations 160 160 160 160
Notes
Dependent variable: coefficient of variation of contributions over the five rounds. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Mixed effects model estimates; random intercepts at session level and individual level.
The RTs are in seconds. Free rider and Full cooperator record the share of rounds in which the individual chose to
contribute zero EMUs (free rider) or the entire endowment (full cooperator). 
Coefficient of variation of the contributions of the 
other memebrs of the group
-0.168
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Table 4. Absolute difference with respect to own mean and response times
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Response time 0.0449 0.0363 0.0622 0.0656
(0.0190)** (0.0236) (0.0168)*** (0.0183)***
Logarithm of response time 1.394 1.551
(0.576)** (0.671)**
Male 0.0972 0.251 -0.726 -0.530 -0.739 -0.539
(1.329) (1.395) (1.386) (1.438) (1.374) (1.427)
Value of common fund lagged one period -0.00709
(0.0124)
Free rider 6.617 6.641 6.522 6.563
(1.515)*** (1.557)*** (1.549)*** (1.568)***
Full cooperator 2.676 2.568 2.835 2.785
(3.153) (3.195) (3.250) (3.321)
Round (trend variable) 0.303 0.365
(0.273) (0.328)
Constant 9.223 10.29 7.273 4.908 6.244 3.312
(1.509)*** (2.729)*** (1.163)*** (1.829)*** (1.773)*** (3.000)
Log of the s.d. of random intercepts (by session) -20.59 -21.92 -20.94 -22.15 -20.63 -21.82
(68.35) (109.2) (93.05) (118.4) (70.47) (83.20)
Log of the s.d. of slopes (by subject) 0.978 0.841 0.936 0.927 0.938 0.928
(0.177)*** (0.209)*** (0.182)*** (0.191)*** (0.180)*** (0.189)***
Log of the variance of the residuals 2.395 2.385 2.372 2.376 2.372 2.375
(0.0426)*** (0.0400)*** (0.0376)*** (0.0356)*** (0.0371)*** (0.0347)***
Wald chi-squared 5.56 3.45 34.45 23.62 167.81 138.97
Log-pseudolikelihhod -3,058.96 -2,440.96 -3,040.45 -3,043.15 -3,040.06 -3,042.34
LR test chi-squared 30.16 15.81 28.32 27.43 28.54 43.50
Number of observations 800 640 800 800 800 800
Notes
Dependent variable: difference between individual contribution at time t and average individual contribution over the five rounds. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel multilevel model estimates; random intercepts at session level and individual level.
The RTs are in seconds. Free rider and Full cooperator are dummies recording whether the individual chose to contribute zero 
EMUs (free rider) or the entire endowment (full cooperator). 
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Table 5. Absolute difference with respect to own mean and response times
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Response time 0.0470 0.0450 0.0605 0.0686
(0.0171)*** (0.0168)*** (0.0167)*** (0.0184)***
Logarithm of response time 0.962 1.234
(0.433)** (0.524)**
Male 0.259 0.462 -0.780 -0.696 -0.825 -0.720
(1.344) (1.392) (1.467) (1.499) (1.435) (1.475)
Value of common fund lagged one period -0.00981
(0.00715)
Free rider 9.173 9.220 8.930 9.019
(1.363)*** (1.348)*** (1.291)*** (1.280)***
Full cooperator 5.876 5.804 6.193 6.117
(2.115)*** (2.117)*** (2.146)*** (2.135)***
Round (trend variable) 0.375 0.378
(0.157)** (0.201)*
Constant 9.104 10.36 5.963 4.672 4.596 2.725
(1.369)*** (2.060)*** (1.348)*** (1.135)*** (1.548)*** (1.805)
Log of the s.d. of random intercepts (by session) 0.801 0.554 0.779 0.780 0.785 0.780
(0.278)*** (0.396) (0.306)** (0.319)** (0.297)*** (0.313)**
Log of the s.d. of random intercepts (by subject) 1.982 2.028 2.037 2.040 2.038 2.041
(0.0639)*** (0.0589)*** (0.0792)*** (0.0807)*** (0.0787)*** (0.0802)***
Log of the s.d. of random slopes of RTs (by subject) -3.053 -3.274 -2.766 -2.631 -2.787 -2.658
(0.405)*** (0.687)*** (0.318)*** (0.332)*** (0.330)*** (0.349)***
Log of the s.d. of the residuals 2.108 2.058 2.031 2.031 2.029 2.030
(0.0600)*** (0.0588)*** (0.0691)*** (0.0686)*** (0.0703)*** (0.0695)***
Wald chi-squared 7.57 13.58 59.44 54.67 106.61 99.92
Log-pseudolikelihhod -2,958.63 -2,355.64 -2,918.58 -2,921.99 -2,916.95 -2,920.44
LR test chi-squared 230.83 186.45 272.47 269.75 274.77 271.33
Number of observations 800 640 800 800 800 800
Notes
Dependent variable: difference between individual contribution at time t and average individual contribution over the five rounds. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel multilevel model estimates; random intercepts at session level and individual level. Random slopes at individual level. 
The RTs are in seconds. Free rider and Full cooperator are dummies recording whether the individual chose to contribute zero 
EMUs (free rider) or the entire endowment (full cooperator). 
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Table 6. Absolute difference between contribution at time t and time t-1 and response times
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Response time 0.00689 0.0463 0.00343 0.00360
(0.00240)*** (0.0164)*** (0.00195)* (0.00217)*
Time used to see the results of the previous round 0.00111
(0.00519)
Male -0.201 0.419 -0.150 -0.150
(0.188) (1.381) (0.162) (0.161)
Contribution (one period lagged) -0.00950 0.00343 0.00944
(0.00714) (0.00195)* (0.00594)
Free rider 0.0986 0.0975
(0.121) (0.124)
Full cooperator -1.408 -1.403
(0.278)*** (0.277)***
Round (trend variable) -0.000536
(0.0733)
Constant 1.596 1.507 1.705 1.616
(0.203)*** (0.202)*** (0.244)*** (0.383)***
Log of the s.d. of random intercepts (by session) -1.867 -1.767 -2.397 -2.381
(0.942)** (0.819)** (1.799) (1.743)
Log of the s.d. of intercepts (by subject) -0.0795 2.034 -0.228 -0.224
(0.0915) (0.0558)*** (0.0855)*** (0.0887)**
Log of the variance of the residuals 0.193 2.063 0.140 0.139
(0.0580)*** (0.0546)*** (0.0523)*** (0.0526)***
Wald chi-squared 9.13 15.30 159.83 492.98
Log-pseudolikelihhod -1,129.12 -2,355.86 -1,084.12 -1,084.08
LR test chi-squared 100.70 186.02 72.66 70.40
Number of observations 640 640 640 640
Notes
Dependent variable: difference between individual contribution at time t and at time t-1. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel multilevel model estimates; random intercepts at session level and individual level.
The RTs are in seconds. Free rider and Full cooperator are dummies recording whether the individual chose to contribute zero 
EMUs (free rider) or the entire endowment (full cooperator). 
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Table 7. Absolute difference between contribution at time t and time t-1 and response times
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Response time 0.00689 0.00681 0.00343 0.00360
(0.00240)*** (0.00231)*** (0.00195)* (0.00217)*
Time used to see the results of the previous round 0.00111
(0.00519)
Male -0.201 -0.193 -0.150 -0.150
(0.188) (0.183) (0.162) (0.161)
Contribution (one period lagged) 0.00253 0.00946 0.00944
(0.00632) (0.00539)* (0.00594)
Free rider 0.0986 0.0975
(0.121) (0.124)
Full cooperator -1.408 -1.403
(0.278)*** (0.277)***
Round (trend variable) -0.000536
(0.0733)
Constant 1.596 1.507 1.705 1.616
(0.203)*** (0.202)*** (0.244)*** (0.383)***
Log of the s.d. of random intercepts (by session) -1.867 -1.767 -2.397 -2.381
(0.942)** (0.819)** (1.802) (1.744)
Log of the s.d. of intercepts (by subject) -0.0795 -0.0679 -0.228 -0.224
(0.0916) (0.0986) (0.0856)*** (0.0888)**
Log of the s.d. of slopes of RTs (by subject) -28.76 -29.69 -26.17 -25.52
(108.5) (115.8) (117.4) (109.2)
Log of the s.d. of the residuals 0.193 0.190 0.140 0.139
(0.0580)*** (0.0563)*** (0.0523)*** (0.0526)***
Wald chi-squared 9.13 11.95 159.83 492.99
Log-pseudolikelihhod -1,129.12 -1,128.73 -1,084.12 -1,084.08
LR test chi-squared 100.70 99.65 72.66 70.40
Number of observations 640 640 640 640
Notes
Dependent variable: difference between individual contribution at time t and at time t-1. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel multilevel model estimates; random intercepts at session level and individual level.
The RTs are in seconds. Free rider and Full cooperator are dummies recording whether the individual chose to contribute zero 
EMUs (free rider) or the entire endowment (full cooperator). 
